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Abstract
To avoid the extremely high proﬁt levels found in recent expe-
riences with price cap regulation, some regulators have proposed a
proﬁt-sharing mechanism that revises prices to the beneﬁto fc o n -
sumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regula-
tor can implement such a proﬁt-sharing scheme, having the option to
revoke the contract if the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are excessive.
When this option is included in the regulator’s objective function
and the cost of exercising it is not too high, a long-term equilibrium
arises with a state-contingent sharing rule that guarantees an appro-
priate level of proﬁts. The model determines both the level of proﬁts
that triggers the proﬁt-sharing mechanism and the consequent price
adjustment endogenously. There is an endogenous regulatory lag ini-
tially characterized by a price cap regulation, followed by a period
of proﬁt-sharing regime where the ﬁrm is motivated to cut prices to
avoid revocation.
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11 Introduction
Regulators dislike high corporate proﬁts under price-cap regulation (PCR)
because they can reduce consumers’ welfare and - favouring the ﬁrm - down-
grade the regulator’s own reputation for being able to set the “correct” price
cap. Recent British and US experience in regulation of public utilities shows
that price cap allows prices to diverge greatly from actual costs and gener-
ate “abnormal” proﬁts for the ﬁrm. This drawback of the price cap as an
incentive mechanism stems from its inability to set a contingent price that
incorporates all the uncertainties faced by the ﬁrm in each period of the
regulatory contract.
In real life, pure PCR has been modiﬁed in a variety of ways to induce
the regulated ﬁrms to rebate part of the proﬁts to their customers. “Proﬁt-
sharing” (PS) schemes - which is how these modiﬁcations are usually de-
scribed - are introduced in the PCR to make the real price depends on the
realised level of proﬁt. Sappington (2002), for example, shows that the mod-
iﬁcations of pure PCR in the US telecommunication industry are usually set
as: a) direct payments to customers or b) reductions in prices of key services.
In this paper we mainly deal with case b). We take the endogenous rise
of a PS rule in a long-term franchise contract between a public utility and a
regulator, where the former is the residual claimant of the diﬀerence between
the regulated price and costs and the latter remains residual decision maker.1
Unlike most of the recent literature on PS, which concentrates on eﬃ-
ciency2 and views PS schemes essentially as actions by the regulator without
technically breaching the PCR commitment3, this paper investigates the con-
ditions under which the regulator can induce the ﬁrm to accept and follow a
PS scheme introduced by unilateral decision of the regulator to favour cus-
tomers.4 In particular, if after having contracted a PCR the regulator ﬁnds
1The regulator’s role as residual decision maker can also be related to the need to
protect the customers’ “right to be served”. See Goldberg (1976).
2The fundamental trade-oﬀ generated by the introduction of a PS clause is between
lowering extreme proﬁts and dulling the ﬁrm’s incentive for cost reduction. The literature
has stressed that compulsory sharing of proﬁtm a yr e d u c et h eﬁrm’s incentive to minimize
operating costs and increase revenue (Lyon, 1996; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996); it may
provide an incentive to undertake projects that are unduly risky (Blackmon, 1994) and,
ﬁnally, it may lead the utility to delay investment (Moretto et al., 2003).
3See Weisman (2002).
4This happened for instance in 1995 when the British electricity regulator - realising
that its previous intervention on prices had been too mild - intervened on prices well before
2that the ﬁrm is making “excessively” high proﬁts, he introduces a sharing
rule to minimize the social welfare loss and threatens to revoke the contract
if the ﬁrm does not comply. Contract closure is then an “outside” option the
regulator can wield to compel the ﬁrm to comply with a PS mechanism.5 As
the regulator has the power but not the obligation to intervene, we model his
outside option as a perpetual call option, with the ﬁrm’s value as underlying
asset. It follows that the regulator must determine the time at which to pay
an exercise cost for the managment of a project whose value is stochastic.
This exercise cost captures both direct and indirect costs of contract closure:
while indirect costs refer mainly to welfare loss, direct costs, reﬂect train-
ing and hiring new personnel and/or adopting new technologies to provide
the service, searching for a new franchisee, or legal expenditures if the ﬁrm
decides to sue the regulator.6
Our results show that when contract closure is the regulator’s only outside
option7 and he can credibily threaten revocation, then the equilibrium is
self-enforcing, sustainability of regulation is reached and a state-contingent
proportional PS rule endogenously determined. However, as revocation is
costly, there may be a stochastic regulatory lag during which prices are not
revised and it is not optimal for the regulator to exercise his option. The
higher the costs of revocation, the longer the regulatory lag and the less the
sharing.
On a formal level, our paper builds upon two distinct strands in the
literature. One relates to the stochastic control techniques recently developed
to identify optimal timing rules and optimal barrier regulations,8 which are
the price review due in 1999. Another well-known real example is Oftel - the British tlc
regulator - which in 1991 unilaterally raised the X factor in the PCR for British Telecom
far ahead of the scheduled review. On this see Amstrong et al.(1994, p.227-228).
5Contract revocation can be seen as an extreme punishment: the management of the
utility is put back in the hands of government, which can then choose direct management,
privatization, or contracting out to another ﬁrm.
6Costs of revocation are higher, the largest is the ﬁrm ability to determine regulatory
capture. For a discussion of regulatory capture see Laﬀont and Tirole (1994, ch.11).
7We do not consider other regulator’s outside options as - for example - taxation of
excess proﬁt. A well-known example of such a power is the ”windfall tax” adopted in the
UK in 1997 and levied on the privatised utility companies. The idea was to claw back some
of the excess proﬁts due to the underpricing of original privatizations and under-regulation
in the ﬁrst few years. For a discussion on the distortions in terms of eﬃciency, equity and
administrative feasibility, see Chennells (1997).
8See Harrison and Taksar (1983), Harrison (1985).
3widely used in the literature of irreversible investments (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994), and emphasize the option value of delaying investment decision, i.e.
the value of waiting for better (although never complete) information. The
second considers the existence of eﬃcient sub-game perfect equilibria for
inﬁnite-horizon threat-games where, in the absence of a binding commitment,
if the threatened act beneﬁts the threatener it is an equilibrium for the victim
to make a stream of payments over time (Klein and O’Flaherty, 1993; Shavell
and Spier, 1996). The expectation of future payment keeps the threatener
from making good on his threat.9
T h ep l a no ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s : S e c t i o n2d e ﬁnes PCR and PS in
a simple reduced-form framework. Section 3 describes the regulatory game,
introducing ﬁrst the timing and the regulator’s objective function and then
the optimal revocation and the regulatory equilibria. Section 4 discusses
results and policy implications, in a comparison with the previous literature.
Av e r yf e wﬁnal remarks conclude, followed by an Appendix containing all
the proofs.
2T h e ﬁrm’s proﬁtf u n c t i o na n dP S
In this section we model the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function in providing a public utility
under a PCR. Our framework is very general: the proﬁt function is modelled
in reduced form as its expected change over time is aﬀected only by market
conditions and the parameters of the price cap regime.
As for the standard price cap rule, we assume that the price is allowed to
increase by the diﬀerence between expected inﬂation (the Retail Price Index,
RPI) and an exogenously given expected increase in productivity over time
(x). Formally:
dpt =( RPI − x)ptdt, with p0 = p (1)
When the provision of the utility begins, the single project gives a cash
ﬂow at each time t expressed by:
π(pt,q t)=ptθt (2)
9See Moretto and Rossini (2003) for an application of a continuous time threat game
to design a severance payments to prevent plant closure by shareholders.
4where, for the sake of simplicity, the operating costs are set to zero10 and
θt denotes the quantity demanded. Uncertainty is captured by assuming
that θt evolves over time by a trendless, geometric Brownian motion, with
instantaneous volatility σ 6=0 . That is:
dθt = σθtdWt,θ 0 = θ (3)
where dWt is the standard increment of a Wiener process, uncorrelated over
time and satisfying the conditions that E(dWt)=0and E[(dWt)2]=dt.
These assumptions enable us to reduce the model to one dimension. Ex-
panding dπ(pt,θ t) and applying Itô’s lemma it is easy to show that π(pt,θ t)
is driven by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dπt = απtdt + σπtdWt with π0 = π, (4)
where by the assumption of a completely inelastic demand function, the drift
parameter of πt is simply α ≡ (RPI − x).11
When the regulatory scheme (1) allows the ﬁrm to retain huge proﬁts,
the regulator forces the ﬁrm to share its “excess” proﬁts with consumers by
imposing a price-reduction mechanism. As Sappington (2002) shows, there
are a number of ways of introducing proﬁt-sharing; the one we consider here
is to set an upper bound on proﬁt, π∗,a b o v ew h i c hah i g h e rx-factor applies.
AP Sr u l ei st h u sd e ﬁned as a modiﬁcation of (1) as follows:12
dpt =( RPI − xj)ptdt where xj =
½
x if πt <π ∗
x0 if πt ≥ π∗ (5)
with x<x 0.
The modiﬁcation of PCR by PS as in (5) requires one to deﬁne: a) the
level of proﬁts π∗ and b) the diﬀerence x0 − x. This is the subject of the
next section.
10This avoids the need to consider such operating options for the ﬁrms as reducing output
or even shutting down, and thereby considering reducing variable costs. The presence of
operating options raises the value of the ﬁrm. See Macdonald and Siegel (1986) and, for
a thorough discussion, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), chs. 6 and 7.
11In this case the monopolist’s proﬁts are increasing in price. This form of the demand
function concords with Joskow and Schmalensee (1986, p.3) who note that the demand
for electricity, water and gas from most industrial customers and all residential customers
is highly inelastic, especially in the short-run.
12See Sappington and Weisman (1996) and Schmalensee (1979) for qualitatively analo-
gous rules.
53 The regulatory game
In this section we investigate the continuous time threat-game between a
regulator and the regulated utility. After a simple description of the sequence
of the moves, we deﬁne the regulator’s objective function - in terms of social
losses - and the value of the option to revoke. We analyse the regulatory
equilibria, ﬁrst in a simple discrete time example and then for the general
case. For the latter we derive a sub-game perfect equilibrium that belongs
to the class of eﬃcient perfect equilibria in pure strategies.
3.1 The sequence of moves
At t = −ˆ t a risk-neutral proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm is delegated to manage a one-
time sunk indivisible public project under a PCR. For this simple contract
we assume the regulator retains ownership of the asset while the ﬁrm has the
“right to use it” (i.e. franchise contract).13 We further assume that no new
investment is made during the contract period.14
At t ≥ 0,15 the ﬁrm has began to provide the utility; if the regulator ﬁnds
that the ﬁrm is making “excessively” high proﬁts, he announces a proﬁt
ceiling, say π∗, above which the gains must be shared. And the regulator
ﬂanks the announcement by threatening to revoke the contract if the ﬁrm
does not comply.
When at t = T∗ the ﬁrm’s proﬁts cross the threshold π∗,t h eﬁrm may
either cut prices to keep its proﬁts below π∗ and thus continue to provide the
utility or else keep its proﬁts unchanged, knowing that as a consequence the
contract could be revoked.
The new lower price remains valid until proﬁts again go above the trigger
13In principle, our analysis could be applied to utilities of global range (national utilities)
but given our assumption on the regulator’s revocation of the contract, the local dimension
of the public utility (i.e.sewage managment and water supply, urban waste disposal and
public transport) seems more realistic. In fact, the management of a contract at national
level can aﬀect the ﬁrm’s bargaining power, which in turn can aﬀect the revocation decision
(regulatory capture). For a discussion of the regulation of local public utilities and the
regulator’s revocation of the contract, see also Moretto and Valbonesi (2000)
14This avoids complications due to indemnities in the case of revocation. See Section 4
for further comments.
15It will be evident below that by the Markov Property of (4), in our model it is not
important when the regulator annuonces π∗ as long it is after the PCR is set. For simplicity
we call this time zero.
6level, promoting another revision. Thus, the game involves a regulatory lag,
which lasts until the ﬁrm adjusts its proﬁts according to the sharing rule.
3.2 The regulator’s objective function
Since the ﬁrm is risk-neutral, using the simpliﬁed expression for the proﬁt








where ρ>αis the constant risk-free rate of interest.17 Thus V being a
costant multiple of π, it also follows a geometric Brownian motion with the
same parameters α ≡ (RPI − x) and σ, i.e.:
dVt = αVtdt + σVtdWt,V 0 = V (7)
Therefore, choosing π∗ is equivalent to choosing an upper limit to the
value of the ﬁrm V ∗. This means that the analysis could be readly be repli-
c a t e du s i n gt h ep r e s e n tv a l u ea st h es t a t ev a r i a b l e .H e r e i n a f t e rw em a yt a k e
Vt as the primitive exogenous state variable for the regulatory process.
Any increase in the value of the ﬁrm may reduce the monetary value of so-
cial welfare; accordingly, when this reduction is perceived as excessively high,
the regulator revokes the contract. However, revocation is costly. Hence, we
may set the regulator’s objective function to be minimized:
−G(Vt) ≡ L(Vt)+( I − Vt) (8)
where L(Vt) is the welfare loss due to revoking the contract at time t,w i t h
L0(Vt) > 0 and L(V0) ≥ 0, and I −Vt is the net cost of exercising the option.
16The market value of an inﬁnite lived project can be evaluated as the expected present









where E denotes the real-world expectation operator and ρ is the risk-free at which future
cash ﬂows are discounted.
17Alternatively, we could use a discount rate that includes an appropriate adjustment
for risk and take the expectation with respect to a distribution for π that is adjusted for
risk neutrality (see Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
7Among the possible many ways of modeling the welfare loss, we adopt a
utilitarian criterion and approximate it as L(Vt)=λ(Vt−V0),w h e r eλ is the
opportunity cost of direct management by the regulator (λ>0 due to ﬁscal
distortion in raising public funds to run the service) and V0 is the value of
the utility at time zero.18
3.3 Optimal revocation
As noted, the regulator revokes the contract if the social loss is perceived
as too large. However, minimizing (8) is equivalent to maximize G(Vt) ≡
Vt−I −L(Vt) which makes it evident that rent extraction can be part of the
regulator’s purpose in revoking the contract (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996,
p.218). Excercising this option requires the payment of a sunk cost I plus a
social cost L(Vt). By the sunkness of I it is never optimal to revoke when
Vt − I − L(Vt) is zero, it is better to wait until the value reaches a higher
level.
Deﬁning F(V ) as the value of the option at t =0,w eg e t :
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(1 − λ)VT − (I − ˆ V ))e
−ρT | V0 = V
i
where ˆ V ≡ λV0, T(V ∗)=i n f( t ≥ 0 | Vt − V ∗ =0 +) is the unknown future
time when the option is exercised and V ∗ is the threshold value that triggers
that action.19 The optimization is subject to (7) and V0. To simplify discus-
sion, we assume that V0 <V∗ so that T∗ > 0 (see the Appendix A.2 for the
general case). Moreover, for the optimal revocation to make sense, we must
also assume that I − ˆ V> 0 and V ∗ − I>0.
18According to the utilitarian criterion and assuming the totally inelastic demand, we
can approximate the welfare function at time t by the weighted and discounted average of
the net surplus of consumers K − (1 + λ)Vt and the value of the project Vt. Hence, the
social loss is simply given by:
L(Vt) ≡ K − λV0 − [K − λVt]=λ(Vt − V0)
where K is the expected value of the consumers’ willingness to pay for the service (Laﬀont
and Tirole, 1994).
19In the range [V0,V∗] the probability that Vt reaches V ∗ is (Cox and Miller, 1965, pp.
8Note that F(V ) represents a perpetual call option. By using standard
results in (real) option valuation20 it is easy to rewrite (9) as:







t for all Vt <V∗




















1−β1 > 0, (12)
Proof. see Appendix A.1
The regulator’s optimal break-even rule is of the form: “Revoke the
contract as soon as the value of the project exceeds the adjusted
break-even value V ∗”.
There are two cases that are instructive here. First, if λ → 0 then accord-
ing to the utilitarian criterion the regulator is socially “indiﬀerent” between
direct management and franchising. From (11), V ∗ drops, increasing the
probability of revocation. A second interesting case is when the opportunity
cost of direct management by the regulator rises, i.e. λ ≥ 1. In this case












if µ ≤ 0
where µ ≡ (α − σ2/2).S t a r t i n ga tV0 in the interior of the range (0,V∗], the process hits
the trigger V ∗ if the trend α ≡ (RPI − x) is positive and suﬃciently large with respect
to the uncertainty. The process may drift away and never hit V ∗,i fα is positive but low
with respect to the uncertainty (i.e. µ<0). In this last case revocation never happens.
20See Harrison (1985) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
21A welfare function in which the consumers’ surplus is obtained from a demand function
that is not completely inelastic would identify a V ∗ < ∞ also with λ =0 . This complicates
the model but does not produce any useful additional results.
9We can pinpoint the timing of revocation by comparing the opportu-
nity cost of exercising the option with corresponding beneﬁts of optimally
postponing the decision. This can be done by evaluating the diﬀerence
F(Vt)−G(Vt) where, by (8), G(Vt) ≡ (1−λ)Vt−(I− ˆ V ) is the regulator’s net
beneﬁt when the utility is expropriated at time t, and F(Vt)=AV
β1
t > 0. If
we assume Vt <V∗ so that the regulator ﬁnds it optimal to wait, we get:
F(Vt) − G(Vt)=( I − ˆ V )+AV
β1
t − (1 − λ)Vt (13)
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er . h . s . o f( 1 3 )i st h ed i r e c tc o s to fr e v o c a t i o nt h e
contract. The second term is the value of the option. Since “killing” the
option is irreversible it appears as an opportunity cost. Finally, the third
term is the value of the ﬁrm; as revocation reduces the welfare loss, in (13) it
appears as the opportunity beneﬁt. Given Vt <V∗ and F(Vt) − G(Vt) > 0,
the opportunity beneﬁt is less than the opportunity cost, so the decision to
revoke the contract should be postponed.
3.4 The regulatory equilibria
As we have shown, the regulator has no incentive to revoke as long as Vt is
less than V ∗. Indeed, as AV
β1
t − [(1 − λ)Vt − (I − ˆ V )] > 0 for all Vt <V∗,
revocation carries a cost to the regulator that makes it not optimal; that is,
the threat of revocation is not credible. On the other hand, for Vt >V ∗
it is optimal; the threat of revocation is credible. This reveals the simple
stationary nature that characterizes this extreme threat: as soon as V hits
V ∗, the contract is revoked the ﬁrm suﬀers the loss V ∗ and the regulator
receives V ∗ − I.
To avoid revocation, the ﬁrm may be willing to reduce proﬁts to keep Vt
below V ∗. However, without the binding commitment of the regulator any
number of ﬁrm’s proﬁt reduction, based on the diﬀerence Vt − V ∗, will be
ineﬃcient. The regulator’s problem is that for t ≥ T∗ he will always have
an incentive to carry out his threat even if the ﬁrm reduces its proﬁts. Since
this means that the ﬁrm will not ward oﬀ the threat by reducing its proﬁts,
it will not reduce.22 Furthermore, by backward induction, the same goes for
any ﬁnite number of proﬁt reductions. The regulator cannot overcome this
problem in a single (or ﬁnite) period setting, and in this version of the model,
22See Klein and O’Flaherty (1993); Shavell and Spier (1996).
10his threat will fail. The unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is ineﬃcient:
revocation is carried out regardless of the ﬁrm’s positive net present value.
To avoid this ineﬃciency the ﬁrm must “control” its proﬁts in continuum.
For t ≥ T∗ the ﬁrm sets V ∗ as its ceiling and reduces its expected proﬁts by
lowering the price cap just enough to keep Vt from crossing the ceiling V ∗, so
that the regulator is indiﬀerent between continuing the contract and revoking
it; that is, F(Vt)=0for t ≥ T∗.
A discrete-time example
To get a sense of the properties of this sub-game perfect equilibrium, let
us look at a simple discrete-time threat game between regulator and ﬁrm. To
focus on the basic question at issue here and to make it simple, we impose
the following restrictions:
1. The regulator sets V ∗ and makes the extreme threat of revoking the
contract as soon, say at time T, as V ≥ V ∗;
2. The ﬁrm’s value remains constant at V ≥ V ∗, for all t ≥ T;
3. Time is discrete, i.e. t ∈ N+ and T ∈ N+;
4 .I ft h er e v o c a t i o ni sc a r r i e do u t ,t h eﬁrm suﬀers a one-time loss V ,a n d
the regulator gains an asset of value V − I.R e v o c a t i o n i si n e ﬃcient,
i.e. V>V− I .
5. A discount factor δ ∈ [0,1) i sk n o w nt ob o t ht h ep l a y e r s .
This simple framework ﬁts into the basic Shavell and Spier (1996) mode
quite well. At any time t ≥ T the ﬁrm may choose to make a payment rt ≥ 0,
upon which the regulator decides whether or not to revoke the contract. If
he does revoke, the relationship is terminated, the ﬁrm suﬀers a loss V and
the regulator obtains V −I.23 If he does not revoke, the game goes ahead to
period t +1and is repeated.
There are many eﬃcient sub-game perfect equilibria for this discrete time
game where the threat of revocation induces an inﬁnite ﬂow of payments by
23In addition, consumers gain the whole stream of past payments rs, where T∗ ≤ s ≤ t.
11the ﬁrm to prevent contract closure.24 In particular, if the regulator uses
revocation as the most severe possible punishment, a set of eﬃcient equilibria
with a constant payment stream over time follows:







), (1 − δ)
¸
(14)
As is usual in these games, the regulator must believe that the payments,
from the initial date and state (T,V), will continue forever. If the ﬁrm
deviates by paying less than r, the regulator concludes that the ﬁrm will pay
nothing in the future and revokes the contract immediately.
Although there are inﬁnite divisions of the surplus V −(V −I) in equilib-






i−tr ≤ V (15)
with the equality for the upper bound r =( 1− δ)V, when the regulator is
able to extract the entire surplus. In the speciﬁc, if we set δ =( ρ − α) the
per-period payment is just the ﬁrm’s per-period proﬁt π.25
The general case
Let us now go back to the general case. If the ﬁrm starts with the initial
value V0, the optimal stationary strategy becomes:26
• for Vt <V∗,V t is allowed to follow the geometric Brownian motion (7);
24See Shavell and Spier (1996, Proposition 2).
25Since e−(ρ−α)∆t =1− (ρ − α)∆t, we may write:
∞ X
i=0







so that r =( 1− (ρ − α))V = π
26We deal here only with pure strategies and keep the exposition at a heuristic level
referring to the Appendix A.2 for the proof of the regulatory scheme and its properties.
Our choice of pure strategies can be justiﬁed within the context of this paper by the fact
that they are simple, requiring the ﬁrm and the regulator to have a very low level of
rationality.
12• at V ∗, a costless “proﬁt control” drt is applied to stop Vt from going
above V ∗.27
The overall process can be described as:
dVt = αVtdt + σVtdWt − drt,V 0 = V, for V ∈ (0,V
∗] (16)
where the increment drt gives the amount that the ﬁrm is willing to pay (i.e.
the proﬁt reduction it is willing to accept) between t and t + dt to keep the
contract alive. We can summarize the resulting regulation in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 (the regulatory equilibria) For any V ∗ >V 0 > 0,if the
ﬁrm regulates its proﬁts with the non-decreasing proportional rule:
rt = a(V
∗)Vt if Vt ≥ V
∗, where a(V












        
        
Do not revoke
at t = T∗ if the ﬁrm has followed rule rt
to keep Vt <V∗ for t0 <t
Revoke
if the ﬁrm has deviated from rt
at any t0 <t
Proof. see Appendix A.2.
As highlighted in Proposition 2, our stochastic-continuous time frame-
work calls for a reﬁnement of the threat strategy used by Shavell and Spier
(1996). This strategy implies an instantaneous response by the regulator
when the ﬁrm departs from proﬁtr u l e( 1 7 ) ,w i t ht h em o s ts e v e r ep u n i s h -
ment.28
27The assumption that the proﬁt control is cost-free is not technically necessary to our
analysis. Assuming that the ﬁrm faces a cost Ct = cdr(Vt) does not alter the results.
28As we know, in continuous time repeated games there is no notion of last time before
t, so induction cannot be applied. We refer the reader to Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)
and Bergin and MacLeod (1993) for examples of how to represent continuous time as a
sequence of discrete-time grids that becomes inﬁnitely negligible.
13The optimal proﬁtr e g u l a t i o nrt is still proportional to the ﬁrm’s value
(see Figure 3 in the Appendix A.2).29 According to strategy rule φ, the
ﬁrm observes Vt and chooses an action (17), and the regulator stays with
(φ(Vt,r t)=“Do not Revoke” for all t ≥ T∗) or, equivalently, at T∗, sets a
continuous time control rule for each realization of Vt for any t ≥ T∗.30 The
value of the ﬁrm under proﬁt regulation is obtained from Vt by imposition
of an upper control barrier at V ∗; rt increases to keep Vt lower than V ∗ and
is given by the cumulative amount of proﬁt control exerted on the sample
path of Vt up to t. It follows that regulation relates to the history of the
game and past value realizations, which makes φ(Vt,r t) a time-dependent
strategy. The regulator’s threat strategy is adopted if the ﬁrm deviates from
t h er e g u l a t i o nr u l e( 1 7 ) . T h er e g u l a t o rb e l i e v e st h a tt h i sm e c h a n i s m ,f r o m
the initial date and state (T∗,V∗), will be retained for the whole (stochastic)
planning horizon. If the ﬁrm deviates, the regulator expects a fresh rule:
a change in the proﬁt regulation policy is perceived by the regulator as a
stoppage of regulation. The punishment for deviation is revocation of the
contract. Since the project is inﬁnitely-lived, the present value of forgone
proﬁts will ensure participation by the ﬁrm, while the expectation of future
proﬁt regulations keeps the regulator from carrying out his threat.
As in (15), we can deﬁne the present value of the ﬂow of payments.
Denoting the expected value of the ﬁrm’s future cumulative proﬁtr e d u c t i o n














where B(V ∗)= 1
β1(V ∗)1−β1 > 0. Direct inspection of (18) and (10) shows









and the regulator’s option to revoke the contract drops to zero (see Appendix
A.2).
29In technical terms, V ∗ is no longer an absorbing barrier but a (reﬂecting) barrier
control, while the optimal control rt is a right-continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative
adapted process (Harrison and Taksar, 1983; Harrison, 1985).
30In our continuous time setting we assume, without any loss of generality, that when
the regulator is indiﬀerent it does not exercise the option.
14Finally, although the public project lives forever, proﬁt is adjusted within
a ﬁnite (stochastic) time span. Owing to uncertainty, neither ﬁrm nor regula-
tor can perfectly predict Vt each time. As Vt follows a random walk, for each
time interval dt there is a constant probability of moving up or down, i.e.
of the game continuing one more period. Therefore the game ends in ﬁnite
(stochastic) time with probability one, but everything is as if the horizon
were inﬁnite. This can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (the timing of regulation) As long as Vt <V∗ nothing is
done. As soon as Vt crosses V ∗ from below the ﬁrm adjusts its proﬁts, using
(17) to keep the regulator indiﬀerent to revocation and F(Vt)=0 .A d j u s t m e n t
goes on up to the point where the unadjusted ﬁrm’s value Vt crosses the trigger
V ∗ from above and the regulator becomes (again) indiﬀerent.
Proof. see Appendix A.2.
Although the ﬁrm prefers to adjust rather than terminate the contract
(i.e. the loss from closure is greater than the expected cost of price ad-
justment), it always prefers to stop the adjustment if the threat of revo-
cation is not carried out. However, since the regulator’s strategy is time-
dependent, the ﬁrm cannot decide whether to continue or stop the adjust-
ment with reference only to the current realization of Vt. For example, if
the “regulated” value Vt − rt goes below V ∗,i nt h ei n t e r v a l[T∗,T∗0) where
T∗0 =i n f ( t ≥ T∗ | Vt − V ∗ =0 −), the ﬁrm may be willing to stop ad-
justing proﬁts to increase its value. However, for the sake of perfectness,
earlier interruption is not feasible as long as the threat of contract closure
is credible. Credibility stems from the fact that the regulator’s option to
revoke if the ﬁrm deviates from rt is always worth exercising at Vt ≥ V ∗,
i.e. F(Vt) ≥ F(V ∗) > 0. At T∗0, however, the ﬁrm can set rT0 =0without
revocation is carried out, and the game starts afresh. The sequence of moves
in this game is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - about here -
4 Discussion of the results
Although the resulting proﬁt control mechanism is simple and proportional
to the ﬁrm’s value, several novel implications follow from our model. We can
now summarize the discussions of our results in a series of subsections.
154.1 The properties of proﬁt control
This proﬁt control has several interesting properties:
• In (16) we can observe that the amount the ﬁrm is willing to share
depends on the regulator’s behaviour only through dt time units ago,
which is interpreted as a reaction time. In other words, if the ﬁrm does
not wish to reduce proﬁts when Vt ≥ V ∗ it takes dt units of time for
the regulator to analyze and react.31
• The optimal proﬁtc o n t r o lrt in (17) represents the cumulative amount
o ft h ep r o j e c t ’ sv a l u et h a tt h eﬁrm forgoes up to time t.T h e ﬁrm must
increase rt fast enough to keep Vt − rt below V ∗ b u t-s u b j e c tt ot h i s
constraint - wishes to adjust as little as possible.
• The control rt is non-decreasing within [T∗,T0∗);
• The control rt is parametrized by the initial condition V ∗ which, in
turn, depends on the revocation cost I a n do nt h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s to f
direct management λ;
• An increase in I and λ decreases rt;
• Finally, as rt depends only on the primitive exogenous process Vt, the
“regulated” process Vt−rt is also a Markov process in levels (Harrison,
1985, Proposition 7, p. 80-81).
The ﬁrst two properties relate proﬁt regulation to past realizations of Vt
and then to the history of the contract. Since Vt ﬂuctuates stochastically, al-
though the intervention is continuous its rate of change is discontinuous. Yet,
as for the discrete-time example, to avoid revocation the ﬂow of payments
must not be decreasing, and is smaller as I and λ are larger. Finally, the last
property is important as it eﬀectively makes the “regulated” process (16) a
function solely of the starting state. At the beginning of each period both
the ﬁrm and the regulator can predict the evolution of Vt by its current state
o n l y ,w h i c hm a k e sa n ys u b - g a m eb e g i n n i n ga tap o i n ta tw h i c hr e v o c a t i o n
has not taken place equivalent to the whole game.
31See footnote 28.
164.2 Price adjustment
As is argued in the introduction and documented by Sappington (2002),
most recent PCR plans for monopoly regulation do not simply cap prices,
but also institute earnings ceiling whose violation triggers proﬁt-sharing with
customers. In practice, in the event of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts going beyond a
“pre-determined” level, these plans require the x factor to be automatically
adjusted upward, making the price cap adjustment rate RPI −x more strin-
gent.
What is the proﬁt deadband that should trigger revision of the price cap
mechanism? And what is the right revision level of the x factor to optimize
expected welfare? Our model enables us to answer to these questions.
• First, the PS rule (17) arises endogenously as the optimal response
from the continuous interaction between the ﬁrm and the regulator;
• Second, the rule is dynamic; the repetition of the relationship implicitly
establishes the terms of a long-term contract, which guarantees the ﬁrm
a “permitted” level of proﬁts;
• Third, the optimal deadband is given by V ∗:t h eﬁrm’s value is allowed
to evolve according to geometric Brownian motion (7) until it hits V ∗.
At this point the price adjustment rule RPI − x is revised to stop the
process Vt from going any higher, and the Brownian motion describing
the regulated proﬁts is now given by (16), i.e.:
dVt =( RPI − x
0)Vtdt + σVtdWt,V 0 = V, for V ∈ (0,V
∗] (19)
where:






(V ∗/Vv) >xis the endogenous new price decrease
factor.32
Let us now discuss the price adjustment behind the PS rule (17) in de-
tail. If the numerical value for V ∗ is known, the optimal policy (11) can be
32Panteghini and Scarpa (2003) and Moretto et al. (2003) consider a similar problem in
a continuous time stochastic model of investment. However, in their model the RPI − x
rule remains in place as long as proﬁts are below an exogenously given level ˜ V,and, if
Vt > ˜ V,the price decrease factor increases exogenously from x to x0.













I − ˆ V
pt
(20)
For any given value of the price cap pt, random ﬂuctuations of θt move
the point (θt,p t) horizontally left or right. If the point goes to the right
of the boundary, then a price reduction is made immediately shifting the
point down to the boundary. If θt stays to the left of the boundary, no new
price regulation is made. Price reduction proceeds gradually to maintain
(20) as an equality. For example, setting RPI − x =0so that pt = p0
for all t, by inverting (20) we obtain the optimal boundary function p(θt)












The boundary function for this case is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 - about here -
4.2.1 PCR vs. ROR
Many authors have argued that setting a PS rule in a PCR is a way of in-
troducing some elements of rate-of-return regulation (ROR) in a regulatory
plan (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996; Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Weisman
1993, 2002; Sappington, 2002). Our framework helps us to clarify this argu-




t = st + ht (s
∗ − st), with ht =
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I ,s t = Vt
I and s∗ = V ∗
I .
33Joskow and Schmalensee (1986, p. 29) have proposed a similar formula that would
adjust prices so that the actual rate of return sr
t at new prices would be given by: sr
t =
st + h(s∗ − st), where st is the rate of return at the prices in the year t (old prices), h is
a constant between zero and one and s∗ is the ROR target.
18By (22), the actual rate of return under regulation sr
t is given by the
actual rate of return without regulation st, i.e. at the prices of time t, plus
the adjustment s∗ − st,w h e r et h er a t ea tw h i c hc o n t r a c ts∗ will be revoked,
serves as the upper “allowed” rate of return. Thus, if at time t the rate
of return goes above s∗, the price is adjusted according to (20) to reduce
t h er a t eo fr e t u r nb yt h ef r a c t i o nht ≥ 1 of the diﬀerence between s∗ − st.
Unlike the formula proposed by Joskow and Schmalensee (1986), in (22) ht
is time-dependent and non-decreasing. That is, ht is the optimal adjustment
rate that keeps the regulator indiﬀerent between revoking the contract and
leaving the project to the ﬁrm. In this respect ht cannot decrease when the
diﬀerence s∗ − st narrows. In the period 0 ≤ t<T ∗ where st <s ∗, we will
have ht =0and sr
t = st. During this regulatory lag the ﬁrm is allowed to earn
the actual rate of return at the rates ﬁxed at time t =0(which represents
a period of “pure” PCR). When st ≥ s∗,i np e r i o dt ≥ T∗,t h ea d j u s t m e n t
rate ht jumps to 1 and remains at that value until dVt > 0 so that sr
t = s∗.
The ﬁrm is allowed to earn a rate of return no greater than the upper rate
s∗ =
β1
β1−1 > 1. That is, we get a period of ROR regulation. However, in
periods where dVt < 0 we will have ht > 1in order to keep the diﬀerence
sr
t − st constant at the highest level reached up to t.
Given that in our simple model the regulator maintains ownership of the
asset and there are no new investments, the cost I of revoking the contract is
the only capital value (rate base) used by the regulator to set the maximum
rate-of-return.34 In other words, in valuing the invested capital as a basis for
calculating the “reasonable” market return the ﬁrm can earn, the regulator
should also include his cost of “exercising the revocation option” as a way of
taking account of the diﬃculties of inducing the ﬁrm to accept future revision
of contractual terms.
4.3 Regulatory lags and the commitment problem
Although formally most regulatory contracts specify both the duration and
the review periods, in reality it is more and more common for the regulator
to change the ﬁrm’s rates unilaterally and/or move up revisions. The best
known example is Oftel, which raised the x-factor in a PC plan for British
34If revocation requires some contractual indemnities (i.e. the underappreciated value
of investment in technology and infrastructures) to the ﬁrm, with −V +Ind.< 0, we can
set I = Ind.+ I0 and I0 ≥ 0.
19Telecom well before the scheduled review date.35 In our model the regulator’s
ability to ratchet the x-factor upward is related to the threat of revocation.
Therefore, the strength of this threat determines the diﬀerence between the
contractual and actual duration of a regulatory arrangement, and hence, the
success of introducing a PS rule in the original PCR.
The diﬀerence between contractual and real contract duration is another
way of looking at the well-known “commitment problem” in regulation. Crew
and Kleindorfer (1996) argue that a major issue in incentive regulation is
commitment: “If a company is concerned that the regulator will penalize it
at the end of or even during the price-cap period if it is successful, it may not
pursue eﬃciency as strongly as implied by the apparent incentives of PCR.
Thus, the notion that the regulator will not renege on the terms of PCR
is very important for eﬃciency to be achieved....(p.218)”. However, they
subsequently admit that as the regulators’ goal is rent extraction, it is easy
to see that they have limited incentives to commit, and that this problem is
at the root of the emergence of regulatory contracts thar incorporate sharing
rules.36
Besides the trade-oﬀ between commitment and reneging raised by Crew
and Kleindorfer (1996) and others37, we have seen that the credibility of the
revocation option becomes relevant to the renegotiation process itself, since it
determines the regulator’s bargaining power and thus the timing of contract
renewal.38 I ft h ec o s to fr e v o c a t i o nm e a s u r e st h e“ i n e ﬃciencies” that the
regulator incurs in direct provision of the utility or in trying to ﬁnd a new
franchisee, or through political and litigation costs, this cost also raises the
problem of the irreversibility of the contract.39 For example, in the case of
35See Amstrong at al. (1994) and Sappington and Weisman (1996) for other examples.
36“Such devices provide sharing of gains to ratepayers and therefore might be seen to
be less vulnerable to reneging by the regulator if the company does well. In addition, such
devices, in limiting how well the company can do, make the regulator less likely to renege”
(Crew and Kleindorfer,1996, p.218).
37See also Breautingam and Panzar (1989) and Weisman (1993).
38The result of an endogenous regulatory lag may also explain the empirical evidence
that while contracts between regulators and private ﬁrms may be of limited duration, they
are often renewed without any variation in contractual terms (Joskow and Schmalensee,
1986, p.7).
39In this case, taxation of excess proﬁts may be a socially less expensive indirect way of
diverting part of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts to the consumers.
20local utilities, after the contract is signed it is the municipal authority that
plays the role of a regulator with respect to the private ﬁrm. The inexperience
of the municipal authority in this role may damage its credibility and thus
determine a negotiating disadvantage (Clark and Mondello, 2000).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Recent British and US experience records increasingly frequent intervention
by regulators to induce public utlilities ﬁrms to accept some form of proﬁt-
sharing; that is, a procedure for distributing to consumers a portion of the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the form of lower prices.
Following these experiences, in this paper we have derived an optimal
proﬁt-sharing (PS) scheme as a unilateral decision by the regulator to favour
the ﬁrm’s customers. In our setting, if the regulator observes that the ﬁrm
is making excessively high proﬁts, he imposes a sharing rule and if the ﬁrm
does not agree to it, he revokes the contract.
We model revocation as an outside option of the regulator, in which the
value of the ﬁrm counts along with social welfare and cost of revocation to the
regulator (Proposition 1). Essentially, we ﬁnd that the threat of revocation
determines an endogenous and non-decreasing state-contingent proportional
rule by which the ﬁrm “controls” its proﬁts, and that this is a sub-game
perfect equilibrium (Proposition 2). However, as the threat of revocation
can be very costly, the long-run equilibrium may show quite a considerable
regulatory lag.
In closing, let us brieﬂy suggest a potential extension of our analysis. The
economic literature on proﬁt-sharing regulation generally holds that sharing
rules diminish the ﬁrm’s incentive to invest (Lyon, 1996; Crew and Klein-
dorfer, 1996; Sappington, 2002; Moretto et al., 2003). As noted in Section
5, our model does not take investment into account. It could be interesting
to allow for investment during the regulatory period and assess the eﬀects of
the threat of revocation on the ﬁrm’s investment decisions.
21A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using standard results on expected present value with barriers (Harrison,
























(1 − β)(1 − λ)+β














(I − ˆ V ) (24)
Easy calculation also shows that the second order condition is satisﬁed:
d2F






I − ˆ V
(V ∗)2 < 0
Finally, substituting (24) into (23) and rearranging, we may rewrite the

















1−β1 > 0. (25)
Note that the same result can be obtained by contingent claims analysis
(Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979). By arbitrage arguments
and applying Ito’s lemma to F, the value of the regulator’s option to revoke
(i.e. his outside option) is given by solution of the following diﬀerential






00 + αV F
0 − ρF =0 for V ∈ (0,V
∗], (26)






∗ − (I − ˆ V ) (28)
F(V
∗)=1− λ (29)
If the value of the utility goes to zero, so does the option to revoke. Con-
ditions (28) and (29) for eﬃcient operation imply respectively that, at the
trigger level V ∗, the value of the option is equal to its liabilities where I
indicates the sunk cost of revocation (matching value condition) and subop-
timal exercise of the option is ruled out (smooth pasting condition).B yt h e
linearity of (26) and using (27), the general solution is of the form:
F(V )=AV
β1, (30)






2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 (31)
As (30) represents the option value of optimally revoking the contract,
the constant A must be positive and the solution is valid over the range of
V for which it is optimal for the regulator to keep the option alive (0,V ∗].
By substituting (30) for (28) and (29) we get (11) (i.e. (24)) and (12) (i.e.
(25)).
A.2 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
We prove that the regulatory scheme proposed is a perfect equilibrium be-
longing to the potentially very large class of eﬃcient perfect equilibria in
pure strategies for the continuous time threat-game described in above Sec-
tion 4. We proceed in the following way. First, we deﬁne the proﬁt-sharing
scheme as a one-sided non-decreasing control (as in Harrison, 1985) on the
state variable V. Then we prove that when the ﬁrm controls its proﬁts by
this mechanism, the regulator’s option to revoke the contract is always equal
23to zero, which makes the sharing scheme a good candidate for long-run equi-
librium in threat strategies. Next, we prove that this is indeed the case
by showing that any deviation from the proposed scheme makes revocation
worthwhile. The non-decreasing property of the proposed scheme is crucial
to this result. Finally, since V is a Markov process in levels, it is easy to
ascertain that the equilibrium is sub-game perfect.
1) Regulation mechanism
We deﬁne the regulation as the reduction dVt needed to keep Vt at V ∗.T h a t
is, the policy control consists of a process Z = {Zt,t≥ 0} and a regulated
process V r = {V r
t ,t≥ 0} such that
V
r





• i) Vt is a geometric Brownian motion, with stochastic diﬀerential as in
(7);
• ii) Zt is a decreasing and continuous process with respect to Vt ;
• iii) Z0 =1if V0 ≤ V ∗, and Z0 = V ∗/V0 if V0 >V∗ so that V r
0 = V ∗;
• iv) Zt decreases only when V r
t = V ∗.





t dt + σV
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Zt ≡ VtdZt = −drt is the inﬁnitesimal level of value forgone up by
the ﬁrm. In terms of the regulated process V r
t ,w ec a nw r i t e :
rt ≡ r(Vt)=Vt − V
r
t ≡ (1 − Zt)Vt, (33)
Although the process Zt may have a jump at time t =0it is continuous and
keeps Vt below the barrier using the minimum amount of control, in that
control is exercised only when Vt crosses V ∗ from below with probability
one in the absence of regulation. Therefore, in the case of V0 <V∗, we get
V r
t ≡ Vt, with initial condition V r
0 ≡ V0 = V, and Zt =1 . At T∗ ≡ T(V ∗)=
24inf(t ≥ 0 | Vt −V ∗ =0 +) c o n t r o ls t a r t ss oa st om a i n t a i nV r
t = V ∗. The ﬁrm
adjusts the project’s value downward by the amount rt = Vt − V r
t ≥ 0 every
time V ∗ i sh i t . T h es a m ec o n d i t i o n s(i) − (iv) uniquely determine Zt with
the representation form (Harrison,1985; Proposition 3, p. 19-20):40
Zt ≡
(
min(1,V∗/V0) for t =0
inf
0≤v≤t
(V ∗/Vv) for t ≥ 0 (34)
Figure 3 -about here-
2) The value of revocation
Although the price adjustment reduces the value of the project but keeps the
contract alive, the ﬁrm always prefers to stop the adjustment if the threat
of revocation is not carried out, i.e. rt = Vt − V r
t ≥ 0, for all t ≥ T∗.
The regulator is not in the same condition. Indicating by Fr(V ;V ∗) the
regulator’s value of the option when the ﬁrm controls its proﬁts, this can be
expressed, at time zero, by (to simplify discussion, we assume that V0 <V∗







T − (I − ˆ V ))e
−ρT | V0 = V
o
(35)
or using rt = Vt − V r
t =( 1− Zt)Vt :
F
r(V ;V




−ρT | V0 = V ]
(36)
In (36) the option value, with a barrier control on Vt, takes account of two
terms depending upon the joint evolution of Vt and V r
t . The ﬁrst (1−λ)VT −
(I − ˆ V ) is the “social welfare” without the barrier (i.e. the value of the ﬁrm
40This is an application of a well-known result of Levy (1948), for which the process:
lnV r
t ≡ lnVt +l nZt ≡ lnVt − inf
0≤v≤t
(lnVv − lnV ∗)
has the same distribution as the “reﬂected Brownian process” | lnVt − lnV ∗ | .
25net of cost of revocation and social losses), while (1 − λ)(V r
T − VT) is the
increase in welfare due to the proﬁt adjustment. Keeping the dependence of
Fr on V r
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As dZt =0except when V r

























































































Taking the expected value of (39), if the following conditions apply:
(a) e−ρtV r
t Fr0(V r
t ;V ∗) is bounded within (0,V∗]
(b) Fr(V r
T∗;V ∗)=( 1− λ)V r
T − (I − ˆ V )




t ;V ∗)+αV r
t Fr0(V r
t ;V ∗) − ρF r(V r
t ;V ∗)=0
we obtain the expression for Fr(V ;V ∗) as in (35). Now the two conditions
(b) and (c) together with the fact that at T∗ t h ea d j u s t m e n ts t a r t ss oa s
26to keep V r
t = V ∗ (i.e. compare condition (c) with condition (29)), give
Fr(V ;V ∗)=0 .
A heuristic but direct way of looking at the same result is to see Fr(V ;V ∗)as
the sum of the value of the regulator’s revocation option (net of welfare loss)
F(V )=A(V ∗)V β1 and the expected value to the ﬁrm of future cumulative
controls due to the adjustment weighted for the distributional factor 1 − λ.
Let us then denote by R(V r;V ∗) the expected value of cumulative future
losses in the ﬁrm’s value due to the adjustments. The rational player evalu-
























t is a Markov process in levels (Harrison, 1985, proposition 7, p.80-
81), we know that the foregoing conditional expectation is in fact a function of
the starting state alone.41 Again, keeping the dependence of R on V r
t active
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41For V0 = V> V ∗ optimal control would require Z t oh a v eaj u m pa tz e r os oa st o
ensure V r
0 = V ∗. In this case the integral on the right of (40) is deﬁned to include the
control cost r0 incurred at t =0 , that is (see Harrison 1985, p.102-103):
Z ∞
0




where r0 = V − V r
0 .
27where it has been taken into account that for a ﬁnite-variation process like
Zt, (dZt)2 =0 . As dZt =0except when V r
































This is a stochastic diﬀerential equation in R. Integrating by part the process


























































Pr[T(l) <T(V ∗) | V r
0 ∈ (0,V∗]] = 0 for l ≤ V r
t <V∗ < ∞, where
T(l)=i n f ( t ≥ 0 | V r
t = l) and T(V ∗)=i n f ( t ≥ 0 | V r
t = V ∗);
(b) R(V r
t ;V ∗)) is bounded within (0,V∗];
(c) e−ρtV r
t R0(V r
t ;V ∗) is bounded within (0,V∗];






t ;V ∗) − ρR(V r
t ;V ∗)=0 ,
we obtain R(V r;V ∗) as indicated in (40). Condition (a) says that the proba-
bility of the regulated process V r
t reaching zero before reaching another point
within the set (0,V∗] is zero. As V r
t is a geometric type of process this con-
dition is, in general, always satisﬁed (Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p. 228-230).
Furthermore, if condition (a) holds and R(V r;V ∗) is bounded, then condi-
tions (b) and (c) also hold. According to the linearity of (e) and using (d),
















1−β1 > 0. (45)
As for V0 ≤ V ∗,Z 0 =1and V r
0 = V0 = V, then R(V r
0 ;V ∗)=R(V ;V ∗).
On the other hand, if V0 >V ∗, we get Z0 = V ∗/V0, so that V r
0 = V ∗ and
R(V r
0 ;V ∗)=R(V ∗;V ∗).










i.e. the revocation option goes to zero if the value of the welfare losses is
exactly oﬀset by the beneﬁts from adjustment of the ﬁrm (lower proﬁts). For
0 <t<T ∗,V r
t ≡ Vt and then Fr(Vt) ≡ F(Vt). At T∗adjustment starts,
killing the option, i.e. Fr(V )=0 , for all t ≥ T∗.
3) Optimal revocation strategy and perfect equilibrium
Since Vt follows a random walk there is, for each small time interval of length
dt, a constant probability that the game will continue one more period. The
game ends in ﬁnite (stochastic) time with probability one, but everything
is as if the horizon were inﬁnite. Neither player can perfectly predict Vt at
any date and the adjustment scheme described by (33) with form (34) is
viewed by both agents as a stationary strategy for evaluating all future value
reductions.42 In the strategy space of the regulator it appears as:
42It is well known that inﬁnitely repeated games may be equivalent to repeated games
that terminate in ﬁnite time. At each period there is a probability that the game continues
one more period. The key is that the conditional probability of continuing must be positive
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.148). Integrating the diﬀerential form (7), the geometric
Brownian motion can be expressed as:
Vt+dt = VtedYt
where dYt = µdt+σdWt and µ = α− 1
2σ2.The diﬀerential dYt is derived as the continuous
limit of a discrete-time random walk, where in each small time interval of length ∆t the
variable y either moves up or down by ∆h with probabilities (Cox and Miller, 1965, p.
29φ(Vt,r t)=

    
    
Do not revoke at t = T∗ if the ﬁrm
plays the rule rt =( 1− Zt)Vt for t0 <t
Revoke if the ﬁrm deviates from
rt =( 1− Zt)Vt at any t0 <t
where φ(Vt,r t) is the strategy at t with history (Vt,Z t). The regulator’s
“threat” strategy is chosen if the ﬁrm deviates by adjusting Vt less than rt or
by abandoning rt =( 1−Zt)Vt as a rule to evaluate future adjustments. The
regulator must believe that the regulation, from the initial date and state
(T∗,V∗), will be kept in use for the whole (stochastic) planning horizon. If
the ﬁrm deviates, the regulator believes that the ﬁrm intends to switch to a
diﬀe r e n tr u l ei nt h ef u t u r ea n dk n o w sf o rs u r et h a tt h er e g u l a t o rw i l lr e v o k e
immediately thereafter. The regulator does not revoke at t if rt0 ≥ Vt0 − V r
t0
for all t0 ≤ t, because value controls are expected to continue with the same
rule and Fr(V )=0for all t ≥ T∗.I f rt0 <V t0 − V r
t0 for some t0 <tthe
regulator expects a diﬀerent rule and carries out the threat, switching from









































That is, for small ∆t, ∆h is of order of magnitude O(
√




∆t),i.e. not very diﬀerent from 1
2. Furthermore, considering again the discrete-
time approximation of the process Yt, starting at V ∗e+∆h, the conditional probability of
reaching V ∗ is given by (Cox and Miller, 1965, ch.2):
Pr(Yt =0| Yt =0+∆h)=
½
1 if µ ≤ 0
e−2µ∆h/σ2
if µ>0
which converges to one as ∆h tends to zero.
















Taking expectation of both sides and using the zero-expectation property of












By the Strong Markov property of V r
t
43, it follows that Et0[VtZte−ρ(t−t0)]=











Since −Vt0Zt0 +( ρ − α)Et0
R ∞
t0 e−ρ(s−t0)Vsds =0 , substituting (40) and rear-
ranging we get:
R(Vt0;V





Secondly, let us assume (t0,t) is an interval in which rs is ﬂat so that V r
s ≤ V ∗,
and t is the ﬁrst time in which dZt > 0. Considering the decomposition (47)
we can write (48) as:
R(Vt0;V





























43The Strong Markov Property of regulated Brownian motion processes stresses the
fact that the stochastic ﬁrst passage time t and the stochastic process V r
t are independent
(Harrison, 1985, Proposition 7, p.80-81).
31w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned V r∗
s = V r
t+s and r∗
s = rt+s − rt for t0 ≤ t. Applying,






































Since rs = rt0 ≡ Vt0 − V r












>From (49), any application of controls rt0 <V t0− V r
t0, leads to a reduction of
(48) for all t ≥ t0 a n dt h e nt oFr(Vt;V ∗) > 0. Furthermore, the ﬁrm does not
adjust by more than rt since doing so would does not increase the probability
of delaying revocation. It does not pay less, since rt <V t− V r
t induces closure
making it worse oﬀ, i.e. 0 <V t.
Finally, as V r
t is a Markov process in levels, it is immediate by (48) that
any sub-game that begins at a point at which revocation has not taken place
is equivalent to the whole game. The strategy φ is eﬃcient for any sub-
game starting at an intermediate date and state (t,Vt).W eh a v es u b - g a m e
perfection.
4) Non-decreasing path of rt within [T∗,T0∗).
So far we have implicitly assumed that, once started at T∗, the adjustment
goes on forever. Earlier interruptions are not feasible as long as the threat of
revocation is credible. Credibility relies on the fact that the agency’s option
to revoke if the ﬁrm deviates from rt is always worth exercising at Vt >V∗,
i.e. F(Vt) ≥ F(V ∗) > 0. As the decision rule strategy depends on the history
of the game, the regulator expects price adjustment to continue according to
the rule rt and any premature halt could make it no longer subgame-perfect.
However, in an optimal Brownian path there is a positive probability of the
primitive process Vt crossing V ∗ again starting at an interior point of the
range (V ∗,∞). In this case, the ﬁrm may be willing to stop adjusting the
32price. That is, the ﬁrm controls its value until Vt ≥ V ∗,letting the agency
expect adjustment to continue according to the same rule rt =( 1− Zt)Vt,
but when Vt reaches, for the ﬁr s tt i m ea f t e rT∗, a predetermined level, say
V 0 ≤ V ∗, it ceases the adjustment. The regulator will face a jump from zero
to F(V 0) ≤ F(V ∗) making the threat of revocation no longer credible.To see
this, consider the possibility of the ﬁrm’s adjustment terminating at time T0
with T∗ <T
0 < ∞, where T0 =i n f ( t ≥ T∗ | Vt ≥ V 0) is the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tV 0
≤ V ∗ when regulation adjustment is under way. The value of the revocation












where P(V 0;Vt) is the probability of the unadjusted process Vt reaching V 0 ≤
V ∗ starting at an interior point of the range (V ∗,∞), which is equal to (Cox
and Miller, 1965, p. 232-234):
Pr(T







with µ =( α − 1
2σ2). 44 As the starting point is now any t ∈ (T∗,∞),we can
immediately see in (50) the dependence on both V r
t and Vt. Since the option
value in the case of regulation is zero, and at time T0 when the contract is








According to the Strong Markov Property of V r












where β2 < 0 i st h en e g a t i v er o o to f( 3 1 ) .S i n c ea tt the unregulated process









≤ 1, we obtain
˜ Fr(Vt;V 0) ≤ Fr(V 0) for all t ∈ [T∗,T0), which implies that:
















Therefore, to prevent the regulator revoking the contract, the price adjust-
ment continues until time T0∗ ≡ T0(V ∗)=i n f ( t ≥ T∗ | Vt − V ∗ =0 −) when
the trigger value V ∗ is hit again for the ﬁrst time after T∗. The game ends
and can then be started afresh.
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37Figure 1: Discrete time representation 
of the game
F: Firm
NR: Do not regulate
R: Regulate
A: Regulatory Agency
NK: Do not revoke
K: Revoke






























39Figure 3: The regulatory timing
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